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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                          No.  00-5234 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                                   v. 
                                 
                          DANIEL SOTO 
                                          
               BOLIVER HICIANO, AKA DANIEL SOTO, 
                                                              Appellant 
                          ____________ 
                                 
          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                 for the District of New Jersey 
                (D.C. Criminal No: 98-cr-00471) 
       District Judge: The Honorable Nicholas H. Politan 
                         _____________ 
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         June 21, 2001 
                                 
        Before: ROTH, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
                                 
                (Filed    January 31, 2002     ) 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                          ____________ 
      
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
      
     In this appeal, Daniel Soto, pro se, asks that we vacate his 
conviction for 
conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C.  1956(h) and 
possession of 
false identification documents under 18 U.S.C.  1028 (a)(3), or, in the 
alternative, to 
remand his case for resentencing.  Soto's counsel filed a brief pursuant 
to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), advising us that he had completed a 
conscientious 
review of the record and concluded that there were no non-frivolous issues 
on appeal.  
Soto was notified that counsel had filed an Anders brief and was given an 
opportunity to 
present for review any arguments that he chose to make on his own.  In 
all, Soto offers 
five arguments to support his appeal (three of which are not covered by 
his counsel): first, 
the District Court erred when it used the amount of money involved in 
Soto's crime as a 
sentencing factor without proving the amount beyond a reasonable doubt; 
second, the 
indictment, and by logical sequence the guilty plea, is invalid because it 
failed to set forth 
all the elements of the crimes charged; third, the guilty plea is invalid 
because the District 
Court failed to follow Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure when it 
did not inform Soto of the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading 
guilty; fourth, 
the District Court erred when it did not grant Soto a downward departure 
in sentencing 
based on his pre-trial conditions; and lastly, the sentence should be 
vacated because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  After conducting the necessary full 
examination and 
review of the proceedings below and of Soto's pro se arguments, we too 
find the his 
arguments without merit, and in affirming judgment of the District Court 
we grant the 
trial counsel's motion to withdraw. 
                               I. 
     The United States Customs Service ("Customs") and the Internal 
Revenue Service 
("IRS") began investigating Daniel Soto (a/k/a Bolivar Hiciano) and his 
wife, Jasa Soto, 
in May of 1996 for suspected money laundering.  The Sotos owned and 
operated in 
Atlantic City their own company, Santo Domingo Travel, which the 
Government 
believed was being used for a money laundering operation.   
     As part of the investigation, undercover agents gave the Sotos 
approximately 
$277,451 to launder to accounts in the Dominican Republic.  At times the 
agents 
portrayed the currency transferred to the Sotos as proceeds from illegal 
drug sales.  From 
September 27, 1996 until June 19, 1998, Daniel Soto executed over 28 
illegal currency 
transactions as part of the Government's undercover operation.  Besides 
money 
laundering, the Sotos also sold false identification documents to the 
undercover agents as 
a requirement for continued money laundering.  Customs' agents purchased 
approximately 16 sets of false identification documents. 
     On July 14, 1998, the Government filed a forty-count indictment 
against Soto, 
which charged him, inter alia, with money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C.  1956(h) 
and illegal possession of identification documents in violation of 18 
U.S.C.  1028(a)(3), 
respectively.  On December 20, 1999, Soto pled guilty to Counts One and 
Forty of the 
indictment.  The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing on March 
28, 2000.  Soto 
was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment for Count One and 36 months for 
Count Forty, 
with the sentences to run concurrently.  He filed a pro se Notice of 
Appeal on April 3, 
2000.  As noted, his attorney has motioned to withdraw as counsel because 
there are no 
non-frivolous issues for appeal. 
                              II. 
     When counsel wishes to withdraw from representation on appeal, he 
must do so 
pursuant to the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Anders.  
Those guidelines 
require a withdrawing attorney to submit to this Court "a brief referring 
to anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal."  Id. at 744.  "Such 
'conscientious 
examination' is grounded in the Constitutional requirement of substantial 
equality and 
fair process, which the Court notes 'can only be attained in behalf of his 
client, as 
opposed to that of amicus curiae.'" United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 
299 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).   
     We are guided in these matters by Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), 
which is 
explained in Youla. "The court's inquiry when counsel submits an Anders 
brief is thus 
twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule's requirements; 
and (2) whether 
an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues."  
Id. at 300; accord 
United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2001).  If counsel 
fulfilled the Anders 
inquiry and we find that there is arguable merit to the appeal, we will 
grant counsel's 
motion to withdraw, appoint new counsel, and request supplemental 
briefing. See Local 
Appellate Rule 109.2(a).  If we find that the appeal is without merit, we 
will dispose of 
the appeal without appointing new counsel.  See id.  In this case, we 
conclude that Soto's  
counsel has adequately met the requirements in Anders and we grant his 
motion to 
withdraw.  We also find that the appeal is without merit and we affirm the 
judgment of 
the District Court. 
                  A. Adequacy of Anders Brief 
     When preparing an Anders brief, counsel must (1) "satisfy the court 
that counsel 
has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues," and 
(2) "explain why 
the issues are frivolous."  Youla 241 F.3d at 300.  The brief need not 
rehash every 
possible claim but must meet the standard of "conscientious examination" 
laid out in 
Anders.  Id.   
     The Anders brief presented here contains an adequate examination of 
the possible 
issues for appeal.  The main argument discussed by counsel is that the 
District Court 
could have granted the motion to depart downward based on Soto's pre-trial 
conditions, 
the possibility of deportation, and family circumstances.  Counsel 
presents a significant 
amount of case law in support of his contention that the District Court 
would have to 
consider these factors in deciding to grant the motion to depart downward.  
Furthermore, 
counsel also discusses the adequacy of the plea agreement under Rule 11 of 
the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and explains how the record shows that Soto 
understood his 
plea agreement and that any argument challenging his guilty pleas would be 
frivolous.  
Although counsel has not covered every issue for appeal conceived by Soto, 
he has 
referred to the issues arguably supportable on appeal.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the 
Anders brief is adequate. 
                B. Arguable Merits to the Appeal 
     Although we generally rely on the Anders brief to identify the issues 
raised for 
appeal, we may look at the pro se brief as well.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 
301.  That pro se 
brief contains five arguments, three of which, as noted, are not covered 
by counsel.   After 
reviewing the arguments in Soto's brief and those raised by the Anders 
brief, we conclude 
that they lack merit.   
     The first issue that is discussed in the Anders brief, and Point IV 
of Soto's pro se 
brief, is that the District Court should have granted his motion for a 
downward departure 
based on his pre-trial conditions, possibility of deportation, and family 
circumstances.  
However, we reject this argument because Soto intentionally withdrew the 
motion for a 
downward departure.  Although counsel argues that he re-requested such a 
motion, we 
find nothing in the record to support this assertion.  Instead it appears 
that, after Soto 
withdrew his motion, counsel merely advocated to the District Court that 
it sentence Soto 
at the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines. This hardly argues that we 
should overturn 
Soto's sentence and remand for a downward departure. 
     The second issue discussed in the Anders brief, and Point III of 
Soto's pro se brief, 
is that his conviction is in violation of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal 
Procedure because the District Court did not specifically advise him of 
the elements of 
the crimes to which he was pleading guilty.  Where a defendant fails to 
call alleged errors 
in a plea colloquy to the District Court's attention, we review only for 
plain error.  United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).  A plain error analysis 
requires that "[t]here 
must be an error that is plain and that affect[s] substantial rights.  
Moreover, . . . the 
decision to correct the forfeited error [is] within the sound discretion 
of the court of 
appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the 
error seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings."  Id. at 732 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
     Here we find no error in the District Court's plea colloquy.  Rule 
11(c)(1) does not 
require that a defendant be notified of all the elements of the crimes to 
which he is 
pleading guilty.  It only requires that the district court ensures that 
the defendant knows 
"the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11.  During the 
plea colloquy the sentencing judge walked through a detailed questioning 
process that 
described all the elements of the crimes to which Soto pled guilty.  Soto 
unequivocally 
affirmed that he understood he was pleading guilty to Count One, charging 
him with 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and Count Forty, charging him with 
possession 
with intent to use and transfer illegal Social Security cards and birth 
certificates in 
violation of federal law. 
     On a related issue, Soto argues in Point II of his pro se brief that 
the District Court 
should not have accepted his plea agreement because the indictment failed 
to allege all 
the elements of the crime for which the he was charged.  Although Soto 
never raised this 
argument before the District Court, "we will consider it in light of our 
prior holding that a 
defendent may challenge an indictment for failure to charge an offense for 
the first time 
on appeal."   United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 507 (3d Cir. 
2000).  "However, 
when a challenge is urged for the first time on appeal we will construe 
the indictment 
liberally in favor of validity."  Id. at 507. We read the indictments 
under Count One, 
dealing with conspiracy to commit money laundering, and Count Forty, 
dealing with false 
identification, as having all the sufficient elements of the charged 
offenses.  Both follow 
the provisions of the statute under which Soto is being charged to our 
satisfaction.  We 
therefore find that there was no error in the indictment. 
     Soto argues in Point I of his pro se brief that his sentence is in 
violation of the 
recent Supreme Court ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  We 
exercise plenary review of a defendant's challenge to his sentence under 
Apprendi.  
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 (3d Cir. 2001).  Soto claims 
that because the 
District Court never proved beyond a reasonable doubt the amount of money 
that was 
transferred, any enhancements received based on that amount, here two 
levels, would be a 
violation of Apprendi.  Soto misinterprets, however,  the Supreme Court's 
ruling.  
Apprendi only applies to cases where a defendant receives a sentence 
beyond the 
statutory maximum.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 860.  Soto's sentence of 48 
months for 
conspiracy to commit money laundering is far below the statutory maximum 
of 20 years 
and therefore this case does not fall into the domain of Apprendi.     
     Last, we refuse to review Soto's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel (Point V 
of his pro se brief) because we generally do not review ineffective 
assistance claims on 
direct appeal and prefer that they be raised under a 28 U.S.C.  2255 
motion.  "There are 
two reasons for that position: (1) if the same lawyer represented the 
defendant both at trial 
and on appeal, it is unrealistic to expect a lawyer to argue on appeal 
that his own 
performance at trial was ineffective; and (2) resolution of claims of 
ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel often requires consideration of matters that are outside 
the record on direct 
appeal and that should be considered by the district court in the first 
instance." United 
States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1993). 
     In summary, we determine that the brief filed pursuant to Anders v. 
California by 
Soto's counsel is adequate and the motion by counsel to withdraw is 
granted.  We also 
determine, based on the Anders brief and the brief filed pro se by Soto, 
that his appeal is 
without merit, and thus his conviction and sentence are affirmed. 
 
 
TO THE CLERK:  
     Please file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
 
                                                                      
/s/Thomas L. Ambro 
                                   ___________________________ 
                                   Circuit Judge   
 
 
 
